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CREATING FREEDOM: BIRMINGHAM, 1963,
A LEGAL SERMON IN CELEBRATION OF




In the early 1960s, I was a boy, living in a boy's small world,
just starting to glimpse the larger world beyond my own. From the
window made by television news, daily papers, and magazines, from
the talk of adults and sometimes of other children, I looked out on
the strange, frightening, and somehow wonderful dramas going on in
foreign places like Washington, D.C., Birmingham, and Selma.
I remember being mystified by the civil rights struggle. Living
in a nearly all-white world it seemed most strange, this obviously
passionate and bitter conflict. Why would white people care so
much about where black people ate lunch or went to school?' News
of the conflict reminded me of the religious wars of old Europe: The
bitterness and fury of the combat seemed far in excess of the differ-
ences between the combatants. When at the end of my third-grade
year I heard another boy ask what we thought about "niggers" com-
ing to our school next year, the boy's evident anger and revulsion
* The following is a revision of a talk given in celebration of Martin Lu-
ther King Jr.'s birthday at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, on January 15,
1999. Had he lived, he would have turned 70 on this day.
** Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author dedi-
cates this work to the memory of his father, Samuel W. Pillsbury, who looked
to Martin Luther King Jr. for spiritual guidance. Professor Pillsbury would
like to thank his colleague, Lary Lawrence, and then Associate Dean Laurie
Levenson and Dean Gerald McLaughlin for their help in organizing the cele-
bration at which this talk was given.
1. Living in a largely white world, I had no concept of the struggle from the
black perspective.
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seemed bizarre.2 The year before, my teacher had been black and
she was the best and kindest teacher I had ever had. What was he
talking about? Where did this rage come from?
I remember a summer of watching protests and speeches and
debates on television with my parents, leading up to the March on
Washington in September of 1963. After the March, I remember
asking my mother if its success meant there would be civil rights
now. I wanted to know if the battle was over. From the way they
talked about the march on TV, it seemed to be. I remember being
astonished when she said "no," that it would go on for a long time.
As I grew up, I learned more about the problems of race rela-
tions, and they became less mysterious. They also became more per-
sonal, more part of my life instead of something outside it. And is-
sues of civil rights have gradually become an important part of my
work. I have come to believe that the civil rights struggle, the strug-
gle for equal respect among groups, lies at the heart of the best and
the worst of our country and the best and worst of our law.
Today I want to go back to the civil rights struggles of the early
sixties, and with the advantages of adult hindsight, consider some of
the horror and some of the glory of those days when an important
part of modem American freedom was created. In particular, I want
to go back to the Birmingham campaign of the spring of 1963, when
some committed young people, with the help of some of their elders,
changed the hearts and minds of many adults in this United States of
America about freedom
3
2. This was in an elementary school in a white middle class section of
Princeton, New Jersey. The student's comments were almost certainly inspired
by the town's adoption ofa voluntary school integration plan.
3. The literature on the modem civil rights movement is extensive. See, e.g.,
TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-
63 (1988); GLENN T. EsKEw, BUT FOR BiRMINGHAM: THE LOCAL AND
NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE (1997); DAVID J.
GARROw, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986); DAVID HALBERTAM, THE
CHILDREN (1998); HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL Is RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN
THE DEEP SOUTH REMEMBERED (1977).
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II. FREEDOM AND POWER
One of the paradoxes of freedom in America is that despite its
uniquely honored place in national ideology, freedom remains deeply
controversial. So much of our national pride is bound up in freedom.
We declare that ours is a free country, the home of the free and the
brave. Our Constitution protects freedom of religion and freedom of
the press; opportunity is the principle undergirding our economy;
democracy the central tenet of our political system. We celebrate
freedom because we are Americans. Because we are Americans we
celebrate freedom. It is our collective faith.
And yet this consensus on freedom quickly breaks down when
we take up the specifics of our lives. When we must decide what to
permit on the Internet, or whether there should be prayer in school,
or gun regulation, or affirmative action, then the fight begins. It be-
gins because, although we think of freedom as something each of us
should enjoy to the fullest, untrammeled by the preferences of the
powerful, in the end freedom is defined by power. The real freedom
of a people depends on who has power, how they exercise that
power, and what limits the society places on its exercise. The ques-
tion is not who will have the most freedom; that privilege will always
go to the powerful. The question is how much freedom the rest will
have.
In our society we rely heavily on law to secure both freedom
and order, concepts often opposed, but always interdependent. We
have committed ourselves to law to mandate a minimum of freedom.
We have committed to the principle that only through law can the
few, the unpopular, and the unmonied, have any chance for the free-
dom to lead a decent and dignified life. This means that the story of
freedom in this country is also the story of our law. It means that to
create freedom--and regardless of what political theorists say about
the state of nature, freedom is something created not found--to cre-
ate freedom is also to create law. By law here I mean not only the
statutes, regulations, constitutions, and court decisions of formal law,
but also the principles that inform our rules, the visions that lie be-
hind legal pronouncements. Thus, although today's story is about
court decisions and legislation, it is also about visions of freedom.
Before we could change our law of civil rights, we had to change our
vision of freedom in America.
January 2000]
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III. COMPETING VISIONS OF FREEDOM IN AMERICA, 1963
Before we can begin our actual story we need some background,
some history. As a historian--I teach legal history among other
things here at the law school--I am tempted to go back at least to the
American Revolution and perhaps to the English Revolution a cen-
tury earlier. I would like to talk about the grand traditions of Anglo-
American political liberty and its many shortcomings, to talk about
the Declaration of Independence and slavery and the United States
Constitution, both as originally adopted and as amended by the Civil
War, to talk about Reconstruction and its brutal demise. I would like
to do all these things-but fear not-I won't. This history is too big
to be told today.
For today it must be enough to remember that in 1963 a power-
ful system of racial apartheid operated in the United States; it
touched nearly every aspect of public and private life in America. It
had the effect of, and was designed to, promote white supremacy.
While it was most obvious and brutal in the deep South, it operated
in some form in every part of the nation that had a significant popu-
lation of African Americans.4
By the early 1960s, many Americans had become uncomfortable
with the nation's way of dealing with race. Many whites were em-
barrassed by segregation and the racial attitudes which gave it life
and strength. Yet embarrassment proved a weak force for change
when confronted with the fierce resistance of many whites who op-
posed any alteration in traditional racial ways, who saw the fight for
segregation as their own freedom struggle. The result was a nation
badly divided over racial ideals and the necessity and pace of change.
4. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944) (the most widely read book on race
relations in mid-century America); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955) (the classic work on segregation at mid-century);
LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM
CRow (1998) (detailing the worst years of segregation); JAMES T. PATTERSON,
GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974, at 375-406 (1996) (a
brief account of race relations in the post-war period through the mid-fifties);
WILLIAM T. MARTIN RICHES, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: STRUGGLE AND
RESISTANCE (1997) (a more extensive overview of the modem civil rights
movement); ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S
CIvIL RIGHTS MOvEMENT (1990) (discussing the rise of white extremism and re-
actions to it by the black community).
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As with many of our most emotional political issues, most voters
probably wished the whole problem would just go away.
One small example of the nation's mixed feelings was the fate
of Brown v. Board of Education,5 the United States Supreme Court's
unanimous decision in 1954 invalidating racial segregation in public
schools. The decision was hailed in many parts of the country as a
landmark of American freedom; in others it was excoriated as an act
of tyranny and oppression.6 In the South, the Brown decision in-
spired a campaign of "massive resistance" against federal judicial
authority, fomented by elected officials, from senators to governors
to mayors and school boards.7 As a result of this resistance, and a
reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court and other federal tribu-
nals to demand immediate action, by 1963 the decision had had little
impact on segregated schools in the South. At the elementary, high
school, and even in some instances, college or graduate school lev-
els, separation of the races was a fact of life in public education in
the South. Indeed, the same was true at the great majority of public
schools throughout the nation.
To gain some sense of the nation's divisions on the subject of
freedom and race, we may turn to three of the nation's most famous
freedom advocates of the day. Each of these men spoke for critical
constituencies, each advocated a particular-and different-vision of
freedom in America. I speak now of John F. Kennedy, George C.
Wallace, and Martin Luther King Jr.
A. John F. Kennedy
For John F. Kennedy, freedom in America depended on victory
in the cold war, on the military, economic, and intellectual triumph
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. For overviews of the reaction, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN
COURT AND THE PURSuIT OF JusTIcE 25 (1998); PATTERSON, supra note 4, at
389-95. See also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMIPLE JusTicE (1975) (the classic study of
the Brown case and the litigation campaign of which it was a part); MARK V.
TUSHNET, MAKING CrVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 168-86 (1994) (describing social reaction and
the Court's analysis of the law inBrown).
7. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 232-71; KLUGER, supra note 6, at 896-
902, 905-19, 848-57.
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of democratic capitalism over communism, particularly the commu-
nism of the Soviet Union and its European allies. On that cold Janu-
ary day in Washington, D.C., in 1961 when a hatless JFK gave the
inaugural address that signaled the beginning of his New Frontier, he
opened with words of freedom. "We observe today not a victory of
party but a celebration of freedom--symbolizing an end as well as a
beginning--signifying renewal as well as change."8 As he contin-
ued, he spoke to the nation about the United States' place in the
world, and about its role in the cold war:
In the long history of the world, only a few generations
have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hours
of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibil-
ity-I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would ex-
change places with any other people or any other genera-
tion. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to
this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it--
and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.9
For Kennedy, and for most of white America, the United States was
a bastion of freedom. This nation represented the world's best hope
for individual opportunity and expression, for prosperity, for peace.
In his inaugural address, President Kennedy did not speak of
civil rights.' 0 Kennedy viewed civil rights as an issue to be managed
rather than a battle his administration would join. Kennedy's thin
margin of victory in 1960 over Richard Nixon depended on the sup-
port of groups with diametrically opposed views of racial civil rights:
white southerners and black northerners."1 In Congress, Kennedy's
8. John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (January 20, 1961), in JOHN F.
KENNEDY, 1917-1963: CHRONOLOGY - DOCUMENTS - BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS
21 (Ralph A. Stone ed., 1971).
9. Id. at 23-24.
10. Strictly speaking, Kennedy did make one glancing reference to civil rights
in his address. At the urging of civil rights advisor Clifford Wofford, who ob-
jected to lack of any civil rights mention, Kennedy added a reference to human
rights "at home and around the world." RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT KENNEDY:
PROFILE OF POWER 39 (1993). The reference was so glancing and innocuous as
to make it politically meaningless.
11. Black support for Kennedy may have been critical to his victory over
RichardNixon in several northern states. Important to securing this support was a
call that John Kennedy made to King's wife, Coretta, in October of 1960, offering
support when King was jailed in Atlanta. Meanwhile, Robert Kennedy had made
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foreign and domestic agenda depended on the support of so-called
Dixiecrats-southern conservative Democrats who were committed
to maintaining segregation in the South. They personified the
South's racially exclusive political system that, since the end of the
last century, had effectively denied votes to most blacks.'
2
The message that emerged from the early years of Kennedy's
administration was that segregation represented an unfortunate blot
on the nation's freedom record that would fade away with time and
quiet behind-the-scenes effort. Responsible leaders had to avoid an-
tagonizing the extremists--those hot-heads on either side-who
would, with the least encouragement, hold the nation hostage to their
minority beliefs.' 3 In retrospect of course, the administration's pol-
icy was doomed. It was like the Reagan administration's notion that
calls in an effort to secure King's release. See GARROW, supra note 3, at 146-49;
BRANCH, PARTmnG THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 355-56,359-66, 374-77.
12. On the disenfranchisement of black voters at the end of the nineteenth
century, see LITWACK, supra note 4, at 218-29. In many parts of the South, vot-
ing rights were not restored until passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In the
early sixties, the Dixiecrats had disproportionate power in Congress because of
their seniority, giving them under Congressional rules control of a number of
critical Congressional committees. See CARL M. BRAuER, JOHN F. KENNEDY
AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 61-62 (1977). Brauer provides a generally
favorable view of the Kennedy administration's approach to civil rights. For an
overview of the politics of civil rights in the early Kennedy administration, and
the administration's general approach to the issue, see PATTERSON, supra note 4,
at 473-78. Patterson also notes the extraordinary power of FBI Chief J. Edgar
Hoover in the administration as an important complicating factor in the admini-
stration's handling of civil rights. In addition to having powerful political con-
nections in Congress, Hoover's knowledge about John Kennedy's sex life gave
Hoover great leverage over the administration. Hoover's personal hatred of Mar-
tin Luther King Jr. and generally racist views of blacks made the FBI a weak
force, at best, in the fight to enforce civil rights in the South. See PATTERSON, su-
pra note 4, at 475-77.
13. For a good account of Kennedy's cool pragmatism toward civil rights
prior to the spring of 1963, see generally REEVES, supra note 10; PATTERSON, su-
pra note 4, at 474-75. Kennedy's early approach to civil rights was colored by his
view that Reconstruction-the period of federally-mandated change in the South
following the Civil War-was a political and social disaster fomented by northern
radicals. See BRAUER, supra note 12, at 16-17 (based on part of Kennedy's book
Profiles in Courage (1955)). Kennedy evidently changed his view of the nation's
racial history as a result of his own experience with southern segregationists, in-
cluding events in Birmingham, and additional reading about that history, includ-
ing the work of C. Vann Woodward. See BRAUER, supra note 12, at 238-40. For
Woodward's most influential book of the period, see WOODWARD, supra note 4.
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it could effectively negotiate with moderate leaders in revolutionary
Iran; it was a policy based more on administrative needs than on a
realistic assessment of the situation. But all of this is easy to say in
hindsight. In the early sixties, many white Americans agreed with
the Kennedy approach, a fact revealed in the press of the day. In na-
tional print reports, southern segregationists were often portrayed as
archaic and destructive figures, but they were frequently paired with
Negro civil rights "troublemakers." This perspective suggested that
both sides of the race debate shared significant fault on the issue. As
Rodney King would say more than three decades later, many Ameri-
cans wondered, "Why can't we all just get along? Why must there
be all this strife?" In the early sixties, for many white Americans themain aim was to remain uninvolved. The whole "Negro problem" as
it was sometimes called, looked like an unholy mess.
B. George C. Wallace
For the second stop on our visions of freedom tour, we move
from Washington, D.C., in January of 1961, to Montgomery, Ala-
bama, in January of 1963. We move from the inauguration of a
president to a governor, from John Fitzgerald Kennedy to George
Corley Wallace.1
4
Wallace, the newly-elected governor of Alabama, had lost his
first run for the office in 1958 because he had, in his words, been
"out-niggered" by his opponent.15 In the earlier campaign, Wallace
had rejected the endorsement of the politically powerful Ku Klux
Klan while his opponent had accepted it. Candidate Wallace's re-
jection of the Klan in 1958 had brought him the endorsement of the
NAACP. But in a state where few blacks could vote, this hurt more
14. See generally DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE
WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1995) (basic sources on Wallace);
MARSHALL FRADY, WALLACE: THE CLASSIC PORTRAIT OF ALABAMA
GOVERNOR GEORGE WALLACE (4th ed. 1996); GEORGE C. WALLACE, STAND UP
FORAMERICA (1976).
15. Will Haygood, Alabama's Ex-Governor Wallace Dies, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept 14, 1998, at B7. But see Howell Raines, George Wallace, Symbol of the
Fight to Maintain Segregation, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1998, at B10
(denying in later years that he made this statement).
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than it helped. Wallace was soundly defeated. As the best politi-
cians do, Wallace learned his lesson from this experience. In his
next, successfal campaign, Wallace took a hard line in defense of
segregation. Shortly before inauguration in 1963, he told a group of
state senators: "I'm gonna make race the basis of politics in this
state, and I'm gonna make it the basis of politics in this country."'
16
And he did just that.
For many white southerners, freedom in America meant states'
rights, it meant defending southern tradition against northern inter-
vention and defending white rights and privileges against black en-
croachment. For these Americans, George Wallace spoke the truth
about freedom It was a truth based in white supremacy. After tak-
ing his oath of office, Wallace told the people of Alabama:
This nation was never meant to be a unit of one, but a unit
of the many ... and so it was meant in our racial lives. Each
race, within its own framework, has the freedom to teach, to
instruct, to develop.., but if we amalgamate into the one
unit.., the freedom for our development is gone forever..
. Today I have stood where Jefferson Davis stood, and
took an oath to my people. It is very appropriate then that
from this Cradle of the Confederacy, this very heart of the
great Anglo-Saxon Southland, that today we sound the
drum for freedom .... Let us rise to the call of the greatest
freedom-loving blood that is in us .... I draw the line in
the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny.
And I say, Segregation Now! Segregation tomorrow! Seg-
regation forever!'
7
C. Martin Luther King Jr.
The third in our group of freedom-speakers is, of course, the
man we honor today, Martin Luther King Jr. Like Wallace, King
16. FRADY, supra note 14, at 143. On Wallace's early political career, see
George Corley Wallace (visited July 24, 1998) <http://www.archives.state.al.us/
govsjist/gwalac.html>; Segregationist Figure George Wallace Dies, L.A.
TIMEs, Sept. 14, 1998, at Al. See generally CARTER, supra note 14, at 68-109;
FRADY, supra note 14, at 94-114, 120-43 (describing Wallace's early campaigns
and his first term in the House of Representatives).
17. FRADY, supra note 14, at 145.
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was a southerner and a charismatic leader who was deeply involved
in the South's, and therefore the nation's, problems with race. But in
most respects, the parallels between King and the first of our trio,
John F. Kennedy, were much closer. Both men had grown up in
privileged backgrounds and showed early promise; both had power-
ful, highly successful fathers who expected them to accomplish great
things for their respective peoples. Both King and Kennedy
achieved public recognition at an early age as potential visionaries;
both were superb public speakers who used the new medium of tele-
vision to inspire and lead; both came to symbolize the ideals of their
times; and both men met the same awful end.18
In his brief time on the public stage prior to 1963-King had
been drafted into leading Montgomery's bus boycott of 1956 as a
young preacher-King had incorporated a prophetic and challenging
Christianity with philosophy of Gandhian nonviolent challenge to
power. Like many great leaders, he was less an original thinker than
an original synthesizer. He saw connections where others saw only
difference. He labored to, and succeeded in, inspiring hope and
dedication where others would have succumbed to rage and resent-
ment.
Unlike Kennedy and Wallace, King was not a politician. He
never ran for public office, never held any government post. He was
a Baptist minister, a preacher, and his vision of freedom came out of
his Christian faith. We gain a sense of King's vision in a sermon he
gave at his Dexter Avenue church in Montgomery, Alabama, in
1957:
History unfortunately leaves some people oppressed and
some people oppressors. And there are three ways that in-
dividuals who are oppressed can deal with their oppression.
One of them is to rise up against their oppressors with
physical violence and corroding hatred. But oh, this isn't
the way. For the danger and the weakness of this method is
its futility .... [A]s the Negro... and colored peoples all
over the world struggle for freedom, if they succumb to the
18. See BRANCH, PARTNG THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 841, 843-44. For a
critical comparison of the two, see id. at 918-19.
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temptation of using violence in their struggle, unborn gen-
erations will be the recipients of a long and desolate night
of bitterness, and our chief legacy to the future will be an
endless reign of meaningless chaos. Violence isn't the way.
Another way is to acquiesce and give in, to resign
yourself to the oppression. Some people do that. They dis-
cover the difficulties of the wilderness ... and they would
rather go back to the despots of Egypt because it's difficult
to get in the promised land. And so they resign themselves
to the fate of oppression; they somehow acquiesce to this
thing. But that too isn't the way because non-cooperation
with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation
with good.
But there is another way. And that is to organize mass
nonviolent resistance based on the principle of love. It
seems to me that this is the only way as our eyes look to the
future .... We must discover the power of love, the power,
the redemptive power of love. And when we discover that,
we will be able to make of this old world a new world. We
will be able to make men better. Love is the only way. Je-
sus discovered that.19
IV. SEV=NG THE SCENE
In early 1963, King and the civil rights organization he led, the
Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC), planned a public
action campaign to eliminate segregation in business facilities in
downtown Birmingham, Alabama, and to establish a measure of ra-
cial equity in employment in the city. The campaign was audacious.
The SCLC planned nothing less than a frontal assault on the civic
fortress of a three-and-a-half-century-old legal, political, and cultural
tradition of white supremacy. It was to be a confrontation with po-
litical and economic power by the disenfranchised and unmonied. It
was to be war fought with words and physical sacrifice.2°
19. Martin Luther King, Jr., Loving Your Enemies, Address before the Dexter
Avenue Baptist Church, Montgomery, Alabama (Nov. 17, 1957), in A KNOCK AT
MIDNIGHT: INsPIRATION FROM THE GREAT SERMONS OF REVEREND MARTIN
LUTHER KiNG, JR. 56-57 (Clayborne Carson & Peter Holloran eds., 1998).
20. See BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 688-92; EsKEw, su-
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King and his followers hoped to force the white power structure
of Birmingham to the bargaining table by the combined force of an
economic boycott of downtown businesses by black consumers and
mass demonstrations against segregation. These techniques had
proved successful in several earlier campaigns in the South but they
had also failed--notably in the SCLC's most recent campaign in Al-
bany, Georgia-and prospects for success in Birmingham, one of the
most fiercely segregated cities in the South, were not good.2'
King and the SCLC planned to coordinate their efforts with the
local anti-segregation efforts led by the aggressive and fearless Rev-
erend Fred Shuttlesworth, but the local movement was strong neither
in money nor numbers. Worse, much of the black leadership of Bir-
mingham opposed King's intervention.22 Meanwhile, in Washing-
ton, the Kennedy administration was very much against the cam-
paign. It seemed to present a lose-lose proposition. If the campaign
failed, the administration would be vulnerable to criticism from lib-
erals who believed it did not do enough to help. Yet significant sup-
port for King from the administration might provoke a revolt by the
conservative wing of Kennedy's fragile political coalition. Making it
all the worse, the campaign appeared to be a loser. King and his
fellow preachers were going to topple the power structure of Bir-
mingham, Alabama? How likely was that?
In Birmingham, a city built around the steel industry, whites had
devised an economic and legal system to maintain a strict hierarchy
of class and race. For blacks, it was considered the toughest city in
the South, combining a powerful political, economic, and legal ma-
chine committed to maintaining racial hierarchy, with an extra-legal
terrorist movement ready to use violence against black dissidents.23
pra note 3, at 193-216; GARROW, supra note 3, at 225-30.
21. On the failure of the Albany campaign and background to Birmingham,
see BRANCH, PARTiNG THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 525-61; EsKEW, supra note
3, at 19-52; GARROW, supra note 3, at 173-230.
22. For a detailed account of the interaction between the local civil rights
movement led by Shuttlesworth, the traditional black leadership of the city com-
prised of other ministers and businessmen, and the national civil rights movement
led by King, see EsKEW, supra note 3. Many in the civil rights movement found
Shuttlesworth extremely difficult to work with, viewing him as both autocratic
and fanatical in his approach to combating segregation. See GARROW, supra note
3, at 237-3 8.
23. For an excellent portrait of the city and its oppressive structures, see
CREATING FREEDOM
Blacks called the city "Bombingham" for the number of political
bombings suffered by blacks. Between 1947 and 1965, there were
some fifty racially-motivated bombings in the city.2 4 In Birming-
ham, blacks held the lowest level jobs in all sectors of the economy,
including the steel industry. All public facilities were rigidly segre-
gated. The city had closed its parks rather than comply with a court
order to integrate them. The city had given up its professional base-
ball team rather than permit it to play integrated teams. 5
Birmingham's symbol of segregated power was Eugene "Bull"
Connor, the city's public safety commissioner, and candidate for
mayor. Bull Connor-who had earned his nickname not for his ag-
gression or propensity to violence, but for the way he could talk-
was a central figure in the drama that King and other leaders hoped
to stage. They had assigned Connor the role of the heavy, the bad
guy whose race hate and brutality would horrify otherwise
disinterested observers. The Birmingham campaign was designed to
antagonize him, albeit by nonviolence. It was a dangerous strategy
on several grounds: He might not react, leaving the campaign
without the drama they needed to win larger public support. Or he
might react with murderous force. In planning meetings, King often
said that he did not think they would all survive the Birmingham
campaign.
At its inception, the campaign was criticized as ill-advised, not
just by segregationists, but by racial liberals and moderates. It was
launched when Connor was locked in a mayoral contest with his
somewhat more moderate opponent Albert Boutwell. Many racial
liberals feared the campaign would create a white backlash that
would favor the reactionary Connor. Local black leaders expressed
the fear that King and his group would come in to stir up trouble,
gain national publicity, and when they had personally benefited from
ESKEW, supra note 3, at 7-14, 53-121.
24. See ESKEW, supra note 3, at 53-54. The most infamous of all the bomb-
ings in Birmingham came after the events told here: the bombing of the Sixteenth
Street Baptist Church on September 15, 1963 that killed four teenage girls. See
TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65, at
137-39 (1998).
25. See ESKEW, supra note 3, at 105-06; BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, su-
pra note 3, at 592.
26. For background on Connor, see EsKEW, supra note 3, at 89-119.
January 2000]
760 LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:747
the attention, would leave to let local residents face the conse-
quences--to live, perhaps, with an even more hostile Mayor Bull
Connor. Time magazine stated in April of 1963: "To many Bir-
mingham Negroes, King's drive inflamed tensions at a time when the
city seemed to be making some progress, however small, in race re-
lations."' 27 The Washington Post editorialized that the campaign was
of "doubtful utility" and was "prompted more by leadership rivahy
than by the real need of the situation.,
28
V. THE CAMPAIGN
A. Round One-A Rocky Start
The campaign was originally designed to bring economic pres-
sure on the city's business leaders by shutting off black patronage at
downtown businesses during the important Easter shopping period.29
Leaders finally decided to delay the campaign until early April, how-
ever, in order to avoid complicating the mayoral runoff election be-
tween Boutwell and Connor. ° Connor lost the election by a large
margin, but pending a court challenge to the governmental reform
also approved in the election, Connor and other former officials held
onto their posts.31 This severely limited the city's ability to handle
the protests.32
In addition to the economic boycott, leaders planned to hold
mass demonstrations which would both disrupt ordinary business and
put financial pressure on the city by filling its jails with protesters.
But despite often lively nightly protest meetings, relatively few vol-
unteered to be arrested. The lack of bodies was so dire that some-
times protesters were arrested, went to jail, bailed out, changed their
27. The South: Poorly Timed Protest, TIME, Apr. 19, 1963, at 31. The article
noted that King had arrived in Birmingham the day after Boutwell's apparent de-
feat of Connor in the mayoral runoff, to start his campaign "[w]ithout consulting
most of the Birmingham Negro leaders." Id. at 30. For background on the city
politics of the day, see ESKEW, supra note 3, at 165-92.
28. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 737.
29. See GARROW, supra note 3, at 237.
30. See id. at 234.
31. See id. at 238.
32. See id. at236-38.
33. See HALBERSTAM, supra note 3, at 434-35.
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clothes, and returned to the original protest scene to be arrested again
on the same day, making the number of protesters seem larger than
they were.34
In the second week of the campaign, King made what he called
a faith act.35 With a select group of demonstrators, King violated the
sweeping state court injunction authorities had obtained to bar virtu-
ally all public demonstrations in the city. King and the other protest-
ers were promptly arrested and jailed.36 As he often had in the past,
King refused to post bail in protest against the injustice of segrega-
tion. The jailing of King and other leaders did not have the galva-
nizing effect that they had hoped it might, though. Unlike earlier
jailings, no one seemed to care much that King was behind bars. It
did not serve as a rallying point for the cause, either locally or na-
tionally. After nine days in custody, King allowed himself to be
bailed out, to return to a troubled street protest campaign.37
History of course remembers King's Birmingham jail stay in a
different light. While incarcerated, King was stung by the criticism
of a group of local liberal-minded clergymen who had asked him to
give up his Birmingham campaign as "unwise and untimely." King
immediately set to writing a response. He wrote on newspaper mar-
gins and on note paper his lawyer managed to bring him. King's
scribblings grew into his famous Letter From the Birmingham Jail, a
work which now stands as one of his most eloquent and complete
statements of his philosophy. The letter was not widely distributed
until much later, though, and much of its contemporary resonance
depends on what happened later in the Birmingham campaign.38
B. Round Two-Sending in the Children
On leaving jail, King and other leaders faced a critical decision.
Should they continue with their original strategy, hoping that it
34. See id. at435.
35. See BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 729.
36. See id. at 728-31.
37. See id. at 747. On April 26, a state judge convicted King and other protest
leaders of criminal contempt for violating the injunction. See id. at 751. These
convictions were eventually upheld on appeal by the United States Supreme
Court See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); HoRwiTz, supra
note 6, at 46-49.
38. See BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 737-44.
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would somehow catch fire, or should they accept the proposal of
James Bevel for a children's crusade, a radical plan that would put
their most beloved and most vulnerable young people on the cam-
paign's front lines. 39 To continue as before meant nearly certain de-
feat. There were almost no more adults willing or able to go to jail.
40
Just as bad, the national press was leaving town and King knew that
they were critical to the campaign's success. 41 The media were the
lever that could move the national body. They could convert the
campaign from a local to a national and even international event.
Imagine, if you will, the meetings between these two Baptist
preachers, Bevel in his twenties, King in his thirties. Were I writing
a play of this drama, this is where it would center--on the behind-
the-scenes discussions between Bevel, King, and the rest of the
SCLC leadership. King was the national figure, the pivot around
whom so much else moved.42 Cautious, well-educated, a brilliant
orator, King had become the subject of extraordinary attention and
equally extraordinary and often conflicting pressures. On his shoul-
ders he carried the weight of the local protest and the long-term wel-
fare of blacks in Birmingham, but also much of the weight of the na-
tional civil rights movement. There would also be potentially
significant international consequences for his success or failure.
Lobbying King for approval of his plan was the Reverend James
Bevel, one of the most brilliant of the young student activists who
had transformed the civil rights movement in the early sixties. Leg-
endary for his flights of rhetoric, his boldness and his eccentricity,
Bevel had shaven his head and taken to wearing a yarmulke to honor
the Old Testament prophets and overalls to honor the southern poor.
Bevel was widely distrusted by the older generation of preachers that
surrounded King, and he made King uncomfortable, as well. Bevel
pushed when King did not want to be pushed, yet King never pushed
39. See id. at 752-55.
40. See id. at 727-28.
41. See id. at 754.
42. King's leadership role at this point should not be exaggerated, however. It
was only following Birmingham and other events of 1963, including the March
on Washington, that King assumed the national role as the man most associated
with the black civil rights movement in the United States.
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him away. King saw in Bevel something of great importance, a more
radical voice that had to be heard.43
At King's invitation, Bevel and his young wife, Diane Nash, had
started to recruit college and then high school students to the Bir-
mingham campaign. Beginning with student athletes and leaders,
Bevel and Nash brought young people to workshops on nonviolent
protest where they were shown a film of the Nashville student sit-ins
of the 1960s. Bevel and Nash had played leading roles in the sit-ins
which had broken the back of public segregation in Nashville. The
movie and presentation proved inspirational. Attendees quickly
signed up and went out to recruit their friends. As more and more
young people joined the campaign, the ages of recruits kept going
down, from college to high school to junior high and even to ele-
mentary school.44
Bevel knew the young people they were recruiting would be
critical to the Birmingham campaign.a Not yet caught in the tangled
economic web of segregation, they were the only members of the
black community truly free to protest.46 And they were willing. 47
They brought the special energy, idealism, and dedication of the
young.48 Bevel exhorted King: send in the kids, send them all in.49
King and his advisors resisted.50 How could they send the youngest,
most valued, most vulnerable members of the community, their hope
for the future, into the angry maw of Birmingham's jails? The lead-
ership resolved that in good conscience, no one younger than college
age should be allowed to march.5 ' They were engaged in a war, and
43. For an extended profile of Bevel and his participation in the civil rights
movement of the early sixties, see HALBERSTAM, supra note 3. The discussion of
Bevel's advocacy of the children's campaign in Birmingham is found primarily at
pages 436-43.
44. See BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 752-55;
HALBERSTAM, supra note 3, at 438-41.
45. See HALBERSTRAM, supra note 3, at 438.
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in war you don't send children into danger, you fight to protect them
from it.
52
But Bevel was not one to take no for an answer, not when he
was convinced of his own rightness. He preached to the preachers,
turning religious principles against their decision. Bevel argued that
anyone old enough to join a church, which for southern Baptists
meant school age--that is, first grade-was old enough to fight for
freedom. 3 If the young were old enough to decide their eternal des-
tiny, surely they were old enough to fight segregation. In any event,
they could not be kept safe. These young people were already suf-
fering from the evils of segregation. Bevel argued that if the parents
could not save the children, maybe the children could save the par-
ents.
54
In the end, King allowed Bevel's plan to go forward--not by
actually endorsing it, but by refraining from saying no.55 Bevel and
others put out the word to the city's young-Thursday, May 2, 1963,
was D-Day.56 On that day, they would march on downtown.57
C. D-Day and Beyond
D-Day started out as another day of protest, like many before it.
Marchers set off from Fred Shuttlesworth's 16th Street Church in
early afternoon, heading for the police lines that barred the way to
downtown. They marched up to the police and were arrested. But
this time the first arrests only signaled the beginning of the day's
protests. Once the first wave had appeared and been taken away, a
second appeared, and a third, streaming out of the church singing and
marching. They quickly filled up all the available paddy wagons and
police cars; finally, school buses were pressed into police service.
By the end of the day, 600 protesters were in the custody of the Bir-
mingham police department. And the nightly protest meeting was
52. On Bevel's arguments, see id. On the resistance of other leaders to plac-
ing young people on the front line, see BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra
note 3, at 752-53. See also GARRow, supra note 3, at 247-48.
53. See IALBERSTAM, supra note 3, at 440.
54. See BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 755; IALBERTAM,
supra note 3, at 439-40, 443.
55. See EsKEW, supra note 3, at 261-62.
56. See id. at 262-64.
57. See id. at261-64.
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packed. Some 2000 showed up to hear King speak about how
moved he was by the day's events.
58
The next day, 1000 young people set out to march.59 It was on
this second day of the children's campaign that Connor, who had
showed relative restraint in deploying his forces thus far, fatefully
changed tactics. With his jails filled to overflowing, Connor decided
to block the protesters by force. Eschewing arrest, he would keep
them from marching on downtown with fire hoses. At barricades on
the road to downtown, firemen set up monitor guns-hoses with high
powered nozzles mounted on tripods, advertised by their makers as
capable of stripping the bark off a tree at 100 feet.60 When the
marchers approached the barricades, headed for downtown, Connor
ordered the firemen to open up. Young and old, men, women, and
children were blasted back. Some ran, others were knocked down by
the force of the blast, some were rolled down the street like leaves
before a gardener's hose, all in front of the national media.6'
Later that day, other marchers found ways around the barri-
cades, beyond the reach of the hoses. This end-around movement,
combined with the action of black onlookers-not members of the
campaign-who threw rocks and bricks at police and firemen,
prompted Connor to deploy his last line of defense: police dogs.
62
Images of ferocious canines snapping at defenseless protesters
proved even more powerful than those of people swept away by fire
hoses.63 This was the turning point of the campaign, not because the
violence was extreme-certainly there had been many and far worse
episodes of brutality in the enforcement of racial hierarchy--but
none so dramatic or well publicized. Now the world could see with
its own eyes the brutality of segregation.64
With the advent of the child marchers, the attitude of the main-
stream press changed. Instead of annoyance and skepticism, writers
58. See BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 757; EsKEW, supra
note 3, at 264-66.
59. See BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 758.
60. See id. at 759.
61. See id. at 758-61; EsKEw, supra note 3, at 266-68.
62. See BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 760.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 758-64; ESKEW, supra note 3, at 268; HALBERSTAM, supra note
3, at 441.
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expressed a measure of wonder, even of awe at what they witnessed.
Time magazine, in its May 17, 1963, issue, described this scene from
the protests: "And there was the little Negro girl, splendid in a newly
starched dress, who marched out of a church, looked toward a
massed line of pistol-packing cops, and called to a laggard friend:
'Hurry up, Lucille. If you stay behind, you won't get arrested with
our group.' 65 In its issue of the same date, LIFE magazine pub-
lished an eleven page photo essay with striking images by photogra-
pher Charles Moore of the Birmingham protests, introducing the es-
say this way:
The pictures on these 11 pages are frightening. They are
frightening because of the brutal methods being used by
white policemen in Birmingham, Ala. against Negro dem-
onstrators. They are frightening because the Negro strategy
of "nonviolent direct action" invites that very brutality-
and welcomes it as a way to promote the Negroes' cause,
which, under the law, is right. And they are especially
frightening because the gulf between black and white is
here visibly deepened.66
D. Round Three-Settlement
The struggle in Birmingham's streets continued for more than a
week, with the advantage going to the protesters. Police arrested
some 2500 protesters; meanwhile, the business district was virtually
shut down. Still, the outcome of the campaign remained uncertain.
Every day brought new chances that the protests would turn violent
and that all the public support won to date would be lost. Several
days' protests were called off or cut short when widespread violence
against police seemed imminent.
67
It was during this week that the Kennedy administration became
actively involved in the Birmingham struggle. Birmingham had be-
come an international embarrassment. Administration representative
65. The Nation - RACES: Freedom-Now, TIME, May 17, 1963, at 23. The al-
tered view did not necessarily extend to the movement's adult leadership. Two
paragraphs later the magazine described King as "the Negroes' inspirational but
sometimes inept leader." Id.
66. Ominous Spectacle ofBirmingham, LWE, May 17, 1963, at 29.
67. See BRANcH, PARTiNG THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 764-81.
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Marshall Burke of the Justice Department negotiated between white
business leaders, black business leaders, and protest leaders. Finally,
on Friday, May 10, after an all-night negotiating session and after
Attorney General Bobby Kennedy raised enough cash from northern
union leaders and others sympathetic to the administration and the
cause to bail out all protesters in the city's jails, a settlement was an-
nounced. All who had been jailed would be freed; public facilities in
the city would be desegregated within ninety days; and there would
be further negotiations on better jobs for blacks and improved race
relations.6 8
Some criticized King then, and later for selling out the move-
ment under pressure from the Kennedy administration, but then, as
so often, King was caught between powerful conflicting pressures.
King was committed to nonviolence and to reaching out to all
Americans. He became the national figure that he did in part be-
cause he insisted on trying to engage all of white America in his
campaigns. In trying to reach out to all Americans, he accepted
compromise on issues that many-on both sides of the contro-
versy-believed were matters of uncompromisable principle.69
On Saturday, May 11, King's worst fears about the Birmingham
campaign were nearly realized. After a large Klan meeting that night
outside of Birmingham, the city was startled by a series of bomb
blasts. A bomb blew out the front of King's brother's house; a sec-
ond bomb went off later that night at the motel where King was
staying. Somehow there were no serious injuries in either incident.
Angry crowds of blacks quickly gathered at the bombing locations,
furious at the all-too-familiar effort to terrorize blacks with blood-
shed. King and his brother made passionate pleas for nonviolence
that were largely, though not entirely, heeded by those who had
gathered in the streets. The situation rapidly worsened when Ala-
bama state troopers, sent in by George Wallace over the objection of
Birmingham's police chief, aggressively moved in to disperse the
crowds. Riots followed, buildings and cars were burned, a police of-
ficer was stabbed. Order in the city only returned with the coming of
68. See id. at 786-91; GARROW, supra note 3, at 258-59.
69. For a generally critical view of King's agreement to the settlement from a
pro civil rights perspective, see ESKEW, supra note 3, at 288-97. See also id. at
299-331.
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daylight. Later that day, Sunday, May 12, President Kennedy sig-
naled his backing of the Birmingham accord by moving federal
troops to bases in Alabama where they could be called upon if
needed.70
Somehow, in the days to come, the settlement held. Neither side
gave way to recrimination, and the risk of widespread violence sub-
sided. The long difficult work of transforming race relations in the
city began. Meanwhile, the center of civil rights struggles moved to
other parts of the nation, but with one critical change. Now the
movement was on the offensive. Now that it had the nation's atten-
tion, and to some extent its sympathy, bigger gains seemed possible.
The political center of gravity in the nation on race issues had
shifted, making possible, though certainly not inevitable, the string of
civil rights achievements that followed in the next two years.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED-OUR FREEDOM ADVOCATES
We come now to that point in our story where we must consider
its lesson. What did all this sound and fury signify? What changed
because of Birmingham? The question defies a definitive answer,
for human events have a complexity that resists simple explanation.
71
As soon as one consequence is identified, a set of rival arguments
concerning effect will emerge. In the time remaining here we must
be satisfied with a quick look at Birmingham's legacy through the
experiences of our original trio of freedom advocates. We can see
what Birmingham meant to each of them, and what it did not.
A. Kennedy
For John F. Kennedy, 1963 was the year he got religion with re-
spect to civil rights. He said he felt sick at the widely-reprinted pic-
tures of a police dog leaping at a Negro woman.72 The Birmingham
campaign and Kennedy's repeated confrontations with south-
em governors over the integration of southern universities finally
70. See BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 3, at 793-800; GARRow,
supra note 3, at 258-61.
71. For suggestions of immediate impact, see PATTERSON, supra note 4, at
480-81.
72. See PATrERSON, supra note 4, at 480.
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convinced the President that this was a battle he had to join rather
than avoid.73
On June 11, 1963, in his first major address on civil rights, Ken-
nedy announced his sponsorship of new civil rights legislation.
Speaking from the White House he said:
We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is
as old as the scriptures and is as clear as the American Con-
stitution.
The heart of the question is whether all Americans are
to be afforded equal rights and equal opportunities, whether
we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be
treated. If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat
lunch in a restaurant open to the public, if he cannot send
his children to the best public school available, if he cannot
vote for the public officials who will represent him, if, in
short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which all of us
want, then who among us would be content to have the
color of his skin changed and stand in his place? Who
among us would then be content with the counsels of pa-
tience and delay?
74
After a brief nod to history and Abraham Lincoln's Emancipa-
tion Proclamation a century earlier, Kennedy incorporated civil
rights into his cold war vision of freedom:
We preach freedom around the world, and we mean it,
and we cherish our freedom here at home, but are we to say
to the world, and much more importantly, to each other that
this is a land of the free except for the Negroes; that we
have no second-class citizens except Negroes; that we have
73. On Kennedy's change of heart generally, see BRAUER, supra note 12, at
246-64. In a later visit to the White House, Fred Shuttlesworth said that President
Kennedy recognized the pivotal importance of the Birmingham campaign. Shut-
tlesworth recalled. Kennedy... used these words. ... "But for Birmingham, we
would not be here today." RAIEs, supra note 3, at 143.
74. SToNE, supra note 8, at 80. The particular occasion for the civil rights
speech made on June 11, 1963, was Kennedy's decision to federalize the Ala-
bama National Guard in order to secure the court-mandated enrollment of two
black students at the University of Alabama. Governor Wallace had gone to dra-
matic lengths to prevent the university's integration. See REEVES, supra note 10,
at 514-23.
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no class or caste system, no ghettoes, no master race except
with respect to Negroes?
Now the time has come for this Nation to fulfill its
promise. The events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so
increased the cries for equality that no city or State or leg-
islative body can prudently choose to ignore them
75
As if to signal the difficulties still ahead for the civil rights
cause, on the same night as Kennedy's speech, civil rights worker
Medgar Evars was shot to death outside his home in Jackson, Missis-
sippi.76 Then in November of 1963, Kennedy himself was shot to
death in Dallas.
The new President, Lyndon Johnson, made civil rights legisla-
tion a major priority. A southerner and congressional veteran, John-
son pushed through the Civil Rights Act of 1964, followed by the
perhaps even more important Voting Rights Act of 1965. Together
they represented civil rights legislation more significant than any that
had been passed since Reconstruction, nearly a century earlier.77
B. Wallace
George Wallace meanwhile continued down the path he had
started when he won election as governor. Using the politics of race
and his own populist charm, he became one of Alabama's most
popular governors. He waged a third-party campaign for president in
1968, winning thirteen percent of the popular vote. In 1972, while
running for the Democratic nomination for the presidency, Wallace
was shot and permanently paralyzed, ending his national political ca-
reer.7
8
In later years, as blacks won the vote in Alabama due to changes
in federal law, and the state's racial politics changed, Wallace be-
came reconciled to civil rights. Wallace claimed that he had never
been a bigot, that he always cared for the downtrodden, including
blacks. He died in 1998, having devoted much of his last years to
75. STONE, supra note 8, at 80-81.
76. See PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 481.
77. See id. at 542-46, 584-87 (discussing the passage of this legislation).
78. See generally CARTER, supra note 14 (giving an overview of Wallace's
political career).
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salvaging his political image on the racial front.79 But in one sense,
his private views must be irrelevant. Wallace's fame and political
success were built on racial bigotry. Thus, if there is a character les-
son here, it is that in politics the character that matters most belongs
to the electorate, not the politician.
C. King
As for Martin Luther King Jr., in September of 1963, he as-
cended to a unique place in American life with his "I Have a Dream"
speech at the close of the March on Washington ceremonies. In suc-
ceeding years, King continued his difficult and often thankless role
79. It is true that before his second gubernatorial campaign, Wallace's racial
views were moderate for a Southern politician. See, e.g., JOHN HAYMAN, BITTER
HARvEST: RCHMOND FLOWERS AND THE CV L RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1996). In
the text the Alabama Attorney General from Wallace's first administration de-
scribed Wallace as a humanitarian in his younger years who then turned into an
open and virulently hostile racist See id. at 232-33. Speaking of Wallace later,
Hayman said:
He literally despised that race of people. It got to be the talk of Capitol
Hill. You could walk in his office, and he was so torn up over this
thing you couldn't even talk to him. If you went in and tried to talk
about anything, he would rant and rave about these damn niggers.
These niggers this and these niggers that! ... He had the meanest
folks around him. He had some of the worst racists around him you
ever saw. I know of two of the men very closely associated with him
who said, 'I don't believe in segregation. I believe in slavery.' And
then they'd laugh.
Id. at 233; see also E. CULPEPPER CLARK, THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR:
SEGREGATION'S LAST STAND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA 168 (1993).
Even before going into politics, Wallace had been an ardent defender of segrega-
tion. During World War II he had impressed his fellow soldiers, not always posi-
tively, with his spirited arguments in favor of white supremacy during his service
in the Pacific. See CARTER, supra note 14, at 62.
Wallace's personal racial views and his efforts at the end of his life to dem-
onstrate that he was not a racist were the themes of many of his obituaries. See,
e.g., Raines, supra note 15, at B10; Haygood, supra note 15, at Al; Deborah
Sharp, Wallace Remembered for Racist Rants, Redemption, USA TODAY, Sept.
17, 1998, at Al; Segregationist Figure George Wallace Dies, L.A. TIMES, Sept
14, 1988, atAl.
Wallace's approach to racial politics may have been summed up by this ob-
servation he made to a reporter concerning his early political success: "I started
off talking about schools and highways and prisons and taxes-and I couldn't
make them listen... [T]hen I began talking about niggers-and they stomped
the floor." CARTER, supra note 14, at 109.
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as national leader of conscience. Even as he was bitterly denounced
by the young and radical for weakness and compromise with the
white establishment, he antagonized that establishment, including its
then-powerful liberal branch, by becoming an early opponent of the
war in Vietnam, and by taking his campaign against racial and eco-
nomic injustice to the north.80
King was shot dead on the balcony of a Memphis motel on April
4, 1968, while trying to help settle a garbage men's strike. Two
months later, presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy was fatally
shot at the Ambassador Hotel, not far from where we are today.
Kennedy, who as Attorney General had strongly opposed the Bir-
mingham campaign, had in the intervening years been converted to
the cause of civil rights and became one of the nation's most effec-
tive and passionate advocates for racial and economic equality.
8'
And here I hope you will forgive a small digression. We justly
celebrate our long traditions of democracy in this country. We cele-
brate our electoral system for the way it brings peaceful change. But
in this celebration we should not forget our history of political gun-
fire. We should also acknowledge the violence that, in arbitrary and
perverted ways, has too often changed the course of the nation.
VII. FREEDOM AND THE LAW--CHANGING HEARTS AND MINDS
You will have noticed that in this law school talk I have not said
much about law and lawyers. That is not because legal matters are
unimportant to this freedom story. The success of the Birmingham
campaign was built on the earlier legal victories of the NAACP and
its litigation campaign against segregation that had begun well before
World War II. Without the work of lawyers like Charles Houston
and Thurgood Marshall, and judges like Earl Warren establishing the
legal wrongness of segregation, it would have been nearly impossible
for the Birmingham protesters to win their moral argument with
white America. Nor would this episode have the place that it does in
our history without the landmark federal legislation that it, in part,
inspired.
80. See BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE, supra note 24, at 611.
81. See PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 692-93.
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The reason I have avoided the explicitly legal is that today I
wanted to talk about law from the outside, not the inside. I wanted to
consider how nonlegal ideas and events can shape the law. I wanted
to remember a little about how the law looks and feels to those who
have never been to law school.
In the first year of law school we teach students how to separate
the law from life, how to pull out of life's complexities the few key
principles which decide discrete legal disputes. Yet the best lawyers
know that law is much more than legal analysis. They know how to
reweave the cloth of life, with legal principles intertwined with the
rich warp and weft of human experience. Knowing this, we should
see Martin Luther King Jr. as more than a preacher and a protester,
but also a legal figure.
King's Christian, nonviolent philosophy gave a spiritual reso-
nance to the civil rights struggle that made technical legal arguments
in opposition sound thin and phony. In similar fashion, the Birming-
ham campaign offered powerful images of freedom-fighting that af-
fected our statutory law, and even our Constitution, by providing
new paradigms of freedom's violation. Today's Fourteenth
Amendment owes as much to the battles of Birmingham, Montgom-
ery, and to Selma, as it does to those of Fort Sumter or Gettysburg.
VIII. OURNEIGHBORHOD AND ITS CHILDREN
I want to close with a few thoughts about the here and now.
Remembering the young in the Birmingham jail, I think about the
children of this downtown Los Angeles neighborhood: the elemen-
tary schoolers with their bright-colored backpacks, moving in clumps
with their brothers and sisters, clutching mothers' hands and stroller
bars on their way to and from the 10th Street Elementary School here
off of Olympic Boulevard, children for whom the names Montgom-
ery and Birmingham must have little meaning, whose families know
more about Michoacan than Mississippi. And I wonder what their
freedom struggles will be. I wonder what they will be for all the
other children of this perhaps-great city.
I doubt if their struggles will look, or sound, much like Bir-
mingham. Perhaps they will be about economics rather than race,
perhaps less about government oppression than the accumulation of
power in private hands; I don't know. What I would say to them.
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what I say to you, is that freedom does not come easily or automati-
cally; its achievement requires the commitment of minds and hearts
and sometimes our bodies.
In thinking about freedom, I urge you lawyers and lawyers-to-be
not to take too narrow a view of law. The law may be comprised of
statutes and regulations and constitutions, but it is not just these. The
law does not sing, but sometimes it hears our songs. The law may be
about logic and rules set by the powerful, but sometimes it can be
moved by love. If you ever doubt this-and we all do sometimes-
remember Birmingham.
